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Abstract. Over 107,000 Americans are currently awaiting a lifesaving organ transplant. The 
vast shortage of organs for transplant in the United States is commonly known, but few are 
aware that the capacity exists for an additional 28,000 organs to be procured each year. 
These viable organs are  not procured because of the limitations of the market and 
governance structure of the organizations primarily responsible for organ procurement 
across the United States, Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs). In this paper, the 
author provides an overview of the current organ procurement system and its flaws, 
debates the newly revised organ procurement regulations to come into effect in 2022, and 
offers a sweeping, market-based reform proposal for the organ procurement system. 
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1. Introduction  
s of February 2020, over 107,000 Americans are on the U.S. organ 
transplant wait list (OPTN, 2021). Each day, 17 people die waiting 
for an organ transplant (Organ Donor, 2020). The need for organs far 
outstrips supply, yet, shockingly, as many as 28,000 (Goldberg et al., 2017) 
organs eligible for transplantation go unprocured each year (The Bridgespan 
Group, 2019). If these organs were procured properly and transplanted, not 
only would thousands of lives be saved, but also $40 billion in taxpayer 
dollars could be saved within 10 years (Rosenberg et al., 2020). Why are these 
organs not being procured and delivered to those in need? The answer: the 
vastly inefficient system of monopolistic government contractors known as 
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) that handle much of the organ 
donation process. 
To sum up the work of OPOs in one sentence, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) succinctly states, “there are currently 58 OPOs 
that are responsible for identifying eligible donors and recovering organs 
from deceased donors in the United States (U.S.).” (Federal Register, 2020) 
As of January 1st, 2021, two organ procurement organizations, LifeChoice 
Donor Services and New England Donor Bank, have merged, bringing the 
total number of OPOs to 57 (OPO, 2021). 
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2. Overview of organ procurement organizations and 
the procurement process 
In order to be an OPO, an organization must comply with both the Social 
Security Act and the Public Health Service Act. Regarding the Social Security 
Act, an OPO must meet certain qualifications and requirements in order for 
organ procurement costs to be paid by Medicare or Medicaid. These 
qualifications and requirements are created by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), a part of the Department for Health and Human 
Services. Pursuant to the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services is required to establish outcome 
and process performance measures that OPOs will be required to meet in 
order to continue operating. If the OPO is unable to meet CMS’s performance 
requirements, it cannot be reimbursed for its procurement costs through 
Medicaid or Medicare and would be decertified as an Organ Procurement 
Organization. CMS’s performance requirements are explained in detail in 
the below section, lack of government oversight (Federal Register, 2020). 
Additionally, the Social Security Act requires an OPO to participate in the 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). The OPTN links 
all members of the transplantation system. Currently, the United Network 
for Organ Sharing (UNOS) serves as the OPTN contractor. OPOs are 
required to report their procurement data to UNOS, including the data used 
to calculate the outcome measures for OPOs by CMS (Federal Register, 2020).  
In total, 57 Organ Procurement Organizations operate in the U.S., each a 
monopoly service provider for the procurement of organs within outlined 
geographic territories, known as Designated Service Areas (DSAs). While 
some OPO boundaries are drawn along state lines, many cross state lines, 
and some OPOs even control islands of territory within other OPO’s DSAs 
(OPO, 2021). The geographic divisions of OPOs are a fossil of how the system 
developed in its early years after the first OPO, the New England Organ 
Bank, based in Boston, was initially created in 1968. Over time, many OPOs 
were created, fell out of existence, were taken over by other OPOs, or merged 
with neighboring OPOs to form the system of 57 organizations that we see 
today (OPO, 2021). 
The organ procurement process begins with an eligible patient in a 
hospital. Patients eligible for organ donation are most commonly those who 
have the potential to be declared brain dead, known as Donation after Brain 
Death (DBD). But, along with recent advances in medicine, Donation after 
Cardiac Death (DCD) has become a growing source of procured organs. 
Hospital care providers have agreements with their local OPO that describe 
“triggers” to refer a patient for potential organ donation. Should a patient 
meet these triggers (which are variable, discretionary, and not readily 
available for study, scrutiny, or comparison between OPOs), then the patient 
is referred to the hospital’s organ procurement organization, as required by 
law. The OPO performs an initial screening after the hospital referral to 
determine if the patient would be an eligible donor. It is also worth noting 
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that OPO criteria for “eligibility” for donation is variable, discretionary, and 
not readily available for study, scrutiny, or comparison by any stakeholder 
within the transplant system, including oversight bodies.  
Following this initial screening, the organ procurement organization may 
decide to rule out this patient for organ donation eligibility or may continue 
to follow and assess the patient. High performing OPOs send a 
representative immediately to thoroughly evaluate whether or not the 
patient is an eligible donor (Organ Donor, 2018). If the patient is then 
determined to be an eligible donor, the OPO should approach the family of 
the patient for authorization to move forward with the organ procurement 
process. Upon family authorization, the OPO takes over clinical 
management of the donor from hospital staff. Once the OPO takes over, it 
provides staffing for the case, including nurses, surgical techs, and support 
staff to begin organ procurement. OPOs should have protocols in place in 
order to maximize organ yield through this process. Concurrently, the OPO 
“allocates” the organs, using the UNOS system to attempt to find matches 
for the organs, once recovered (LWW, 2008). 
The contents of this paper will discuss the problems and a possible 
solution to inefficiencies at the OPO level that inhibit an OPO’s ability to 
successfully and efficiently procure organs. This paper will not discuss the 
match or allocation services, or waitlist policies created and enforced by 
UNOS. 
Although the system is of maximal importance to the United States 
population, the organ procurement system is flawed and inefficient, with as 
many as 28,000 eligible organs going unprocured or otherwise 
untransplanted each year (Organ Donor, 2018). Little is reported or 
understood about the efficiency and effectiveness of the OPO system, as 
OPOs report essentially no process-related data to any oversight body or 
UNOS. Notably, “critical process breakdowns…such as untimely referrals, 
suboptimal requests for donation, or early extubating, are therefore not 
visible to the national transplant community” (Rosenberg, et al., 2020). Due 
to poor oversight, many of the worst issues within the procurement system 
are kept secret. Several activist and policy reform advocate organizations, 
one of the most vocal being the patient advocacy group Organize, have been 
outspoken with their displeasure with the organ procurement system: 
“Performance varies across the OPO network, with many persistent 
underperformers failing to improve over the last decade” (Doby, et al., 2019).  
Currently available objective data indicates wide variance among OPO 
performance; with many OPOs performing significantly worse than others. 
The term “performance” obscures the human meaning of this inefficiency, 
since low, ineffective, or inefficient performance means eligible organs go 
unprocured and Americans continue to hold a spot on a deadly transplant 
waitlist. Because of the significant OPO performance variance, many 
hospitals are stuck working with underperforming OPOs. Over time, “when 
OPOs are inefficient or ineffective, donor hospitals are reluctant to refer 
potential donors, and transplant centers have fewer organ offers for patients 
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on the waiting list. The end result is a bottleneck within the system that leads 
to avoidable deaths and increased national health care spending” (Organ 
Donation Report, 2019). In many instances involving the worst performing 
OPOs, upon a hospital’s referral, the OPO may respond late or not respond 
at all. In organ procurement, ischemic time (the time that organs are viable 
for transplantation) is severely limited, (Organ Donation in Nebraska) and 
extended case times or suboptimal OPO practice that adds ischemic time can 
result in far fewer successful transplantations. Moreover, data suggest that 
as hospitals become more frustrated with OPO performance, death referral 
rates from the hospital to the OPO tend to drop correspondingly. In some 
cases, hospitals have so grown so frustrated with OPOs and their lack of 
responsiveness, that they refer very few potential donors to their OPO (Doby 
et al., 2021). 
Another complaint regarding organ procurement argues that the metrics 
by which OPOs are judged, which are created by CMS and should 
incentivize maximal organ procurement, have actually steered organ 
procurement organizations in the opposite direction. A comprehensive 
report in 2019 compiled by the Bridgespan group noted that “existing 
regulations need dramatic improvement to remove perverse incentives to 
organ procurement (for example, OPOs are evaluated on the number of 
organs procured per donor, which leads to older single-organ donors being 
overlooked) and increase continuous performance accountability” (The 
Bridgespan, 2019). 
Why do all of these problems occur within the organ procurement 
system? Organ Procurement Organizations have few incentives to succeed 
beside the good consciences of their executives. OPOs face no market 
pressures to succeed and have never faced significant retaliation from their 
regulatory body, CMS. This combination of a lack of market and government 
incentives has resulted in a massive 470% discrepancy in transplantation 
rates as a percentage of inpatient deaths between the best and worst OPOs 
(Federal Register, 2020). 
 
3. Potential of reform 
If the discrepancies between OPOs were diminished and all OPOs were 
held to a high standard by CMS, benefits abound. A study by researchers at 
the University of Pennsylvania, and subsequent analysis by the Bridgespan 
Group found that each year, if the organ procurement system operated 
perfectly efficiently, an additional 28,000 organs could be procured and 
transplanted. And, because some patients receive more than one organ, this 
could result in an additional 25,000 lives saved each year (Rosenberg, et al., 
2020). 
In addition, the benefits to the American taxpayer are significant. The 
most common organ needed for transplant are kidneys. For those in need of 
a kidney transplant, many require dialysis treatments until they are able to 
receive a kidney transplant. Dialysis treatments cost Medicare about $90,000 
per person per year. When compared to the average cost of surgery and 
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immunosuppressive drugs in the years thereafter, a kidney transplant would 
save Medicare $250,000 per transplant over the first five years after the 
transplant (Kessler & Roth, 2014). When combining these cost saving figures 
with the 28,000 potential for procured organs, the Bridgespan group 
estimates roughly 40 billion could be saved in Medicare costs over ten years 
by capitalizing on the organ donation capabilities of the United States 
(Rosenberg, et al., 2020). 
 
4. Flaws of the current procurement system 
Many key problems of the current system source from poor government 
regulations and are described in detail below. All of which result in wasted 
eligible organs and taxpayer dollars. In short, as phrased by Steve H. Hanke, 
“the shortage of kidneys and other organs is substantially, and probably 
fully, the fault of inhumane government regulations.” (Hanke, 2019). 
 
4.1. Designated service areas (DSAs): 
Each of the 57 OPOs have been given exclusive rights to the procurement 
of organs within specified geographic areas known as Designated Service 
Areas (DSAs). These areas do not follow lines that would imply efficiency, 
or perfectly follow states lines, but are rather a remaining, arcane factor 
leftover from when the system was originally set up in the 1960s, and how it 
grew in the years following. The adverse consequences of this setup are 
numerous. 
 First, while an OPO may have facilities, staff, and infrastructure near an 
OPO territory border, these resources are limited and bound. The OPO 
cannot procure an organ on the other side of its geographic boundaries, 
except in special cases, even if it may be the organization best fitted to 
perform the procurement. For example, although an OPO based in Maryland 
may be more efficient and timelier than its counterpart in Virginia, hospitals 
and patients in Virginia, even those near the Maryland border, are stuck 
working with their inefficient and slow OPO. This inefficient system means 
that although the infrastructure may be available for a successful and timely 
procurement to occur, many organs go unprocured or are procured too late 
(Rosenberg, et al. 2020). 
A second factor regarding designated service areas is that OPOs do not 
have to compete with each other to secure hospital contracts or procure 
organs. Each OPO has complete reign over the procurement of all organs 
within its DSA. No other OPO, except in special cases where hospitals are 
granted a waiver to work with different OPOs, is able to procure organs 
within other DSAs. So, in their contentment, each OPO does not have 
incentives to beat out other OPOs, especially its neighbors, even if the OPO 
itself is underperforming. Each OPO does not have an incentive to better its 
relationship with hospitals, or improve its referral response time, because 
there is no other OPO that could work with the hospital and procure organs 
within its boundaries. In fact, OPOs disregard their service areas to the 
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extreme extent that “just over half (56.4%) of the HCPs [health-care 
providers] interviewed found OPO staff to be helpful or supportive, and 
only 8% considered them part of the hospital team. While legal and 
regulatory statutes mandate the involvement of OPO staff during consent 
for donation and subsequent maintenance of donor-eligible patients, nearly 
two-thirds of respondents considered OPO staff “outsiders” while some 
characterized them as ‘bullies’ or ‘vultures’” (Traino et al., 2012). It is clear 
that many OPOs, without incentives to succeed, have allowed their 
performance, and their patients, to suffer. 
Hospitals do, in fact, have the ability to petition the Department of Health 
and Human Services to work with a different OPO (OPO, 2020). Yet, the 
petition system is rarely used for a number of reasons. First, organ donation 
is a small part of any hospitals’ work, and at any given hospital, there is little 
incentive to expend effort or time to investigate or interrogate their local 
OPO’s effectiveness or efficiency. Compounding the problem is the lack of 
objective data on OPO performance, meaning hospitals may not even be 
aware that their OPO is underperforming because the hospital has only ever 
worked with its current OPO. And, the hospital receives potentially biased 
reports about its OPO’s performance as OPOs are not incentivized to tell the 
hospitals it serves that another OPO could provide superior service. Finally, 
the hospital may be securely within the center of an OPO’s geographic area 
and would actually experience diminished service by working with a distant 
OPO rather than their current OPO due to prolonged response times and a 
lack of OPO infrastructure nearby. So, the hospital, in reality, has few 
incentives to investigate alternatives and even fewer practical options to 
pursue them. 
 
4.2. Lack of government oversight 
Another possible motivation for OPOs to perform well and efficiently 
would source from possible regulatory punishment for poor performance. 
All OPOs should be held accountable by their governing agency, the Center 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), yet no OPO has had its 
certification for service revoked. CMS is responsible for reviewing all OPO 
performance every four years and should, in theory, be able to revoke 
contracts of those underperforming OPOs that do not meet performance 
requirements. Since their establishment in 2006, and until the new 
regulations take effect in January 2022, the “Conditions for Coverage” (CfCs) 
that OPOs are expected to meet are listed below. In order to retain 
certification as an OPO, organizations must meet at least two of the three 
criteria. 
1. “The OPO’s donation rate of eligible donors as a percentage of 
eligible deaths is no more than 1.5 standard deviations below the mean 
national donation rate of eligible donors as a percentage of eligible deaths, 
averaged over the 4 years of the re-certification cycle. Both the numerator 
and denominator of an individual OPO’s donation rate ratio are adjusted 
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by adding a 1 for each donation after cardiac death donor and each donor 
over the age of 70. 
2. The observed donation rate is not significantly lower than the 
expected donation rate for 18 or more months of the 36 months of data 
used for re– certification, as calculated by SRTR. 
3. The OPO data reports, averaged over the 4 years of the re-
certification cycle, must meet the rules and requirements of the most 
current OPTN aggregate donor yield measure” (Federal Register, 2020). 
Yet, since the above CfCs were finalized in 2006, several problems have 
presented themselves to CMS and system stakeholders. 
First, OPOs are self-reporting their data with little oversight. The same 
data that should be used to judge OPOs and could result in their 
decertification, was being interpreted and reported by the OPOs themselves. 
So, it is no surprise that no OPO has ever been successfully decertified for 
not meeting the above CfCs (Rosenberg, et al., 2020). OPOs are often able to 
interpret definitions of certain terms, and because they are reporting their 
own data without oversight, reported procurement data is unreliable. 
According to recent CMS documents outlining a proposed, and now 
finalized, rule change explained below, “most comments have centered on 
the self-defined and self-reported nature of the data on ‘eligible deaths’ that 
are used for the evaluation of the outcome measures. Stakeholders 
increasingly have brought to our attention that the interpretation of ‘eligible 
deaths’ appears to be inconsistent across donation service areas (DSAs), and 
that ‘all OPO data is unaudited and self-reported’ and therefore, ‘the 
accuracy and consistency of that data cannot be assured” (Federal Register, 
2020). 
Another common complaint of the CfCs focuses on the third condition. 
The OPTN donor yield measure judges OPO performance based on how 
many organs are procured per donor (donor yield). Yet, the problem 
associated with this rule is that high-yield donors (those that are younger 
and can donate several organs) are prioritized significantly over low-yield 
donors (those who are often older and may only be able to donate a single 
organ). Actually, pursuing too many low-yield donors would pull down an 
OPO’s donor yield measure. “According to stakeholders, there are ‘pressures 
from donor yield reporting’ that ‘drives OPOs to walk away from cases in 
which the donor only has one organ viable for transplant (such as for older 
patients, where it is common that only the liver is medically viable), even in 
cases where next of kin consents to donation.’ As a result, some commenters 
have suggested that ‘the regulations may be causing OPOs to ‘game’ the 
process of meeting [this] standard by only targeting ‘high-yield’ organ 
candidates” (Federal Register, 2020). Years after the third CfC was written 
into law, it continues to disincentivize OPOs from pursuing every possible 
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4.3. Costliness  
OPOs are not for profit businesses, and their costs are covered fully by the 
patient who receives an organ transplantation. Upon transplantation, the 
ultimate payor of the fees is that who receives the transplant(s). So, thereby, 
the ultimate and primary payor then becomes Medicare, Medicaid, or 
private insurance. Each payor is required to pay transplantation costs as 
calculated and reported by the OPOs, known as a standard acquisition cost 
(SAC). Not surprisingly, these costs vary widely across OPOs (Held et al., 
2017; 2019). So, someone who receives a transplant could pay significantly 
more for transplantation services than someone within the same hospital 
who receives a similar transplant soon after only because of which OPO 
procured the organ.  
For kidney transplants in particular, all costs are covered by Medicare. 
Medicare pays each OPO based on an established rate between CMS and the 
OPO. 
Because OPOs are monopolistic contractors who simply pass through 
costs to insurers, they have no incentives to lower their costs. Because the 
patient is also not the direct, primary payor, the cost does not factor into his 
or her decision on whether to receive the organ or not. And, because 
receiving the organ is an absolute necessity, insurance companies or 
Medicare/Medicaid are stuck paying high prices for organ procurement 
services. Organ procurement organizations have no incentives to lower their 
costs because of these factors and so, each year, because of Medicare and 
Medicaid’s obligations to patients, millions of taxpayer dollars are spent on 
procurement services that could be done much more cheaply by the not-for-
profit OPOs. 
 
5. A new regulatory structure finalized in November 
2020 
Although the organ procurement system had been under fire from 
stakeholders and activists groups for some time, President Trump took 
action with an executive order in July 2019. President Trump’s executive 
order, number 13879, covered many topics regarding kidney health in the 
United States and began with the lines: “[m]y Administration is dedicated to 
advancing American kidney health. The status of care for patients with 
chronic kidney disease and end-stage renal disease (ESRD) is unacceptable: 
too many at-risk patients progress to late-stage kidney failure; the mortality 
rate is too high; current treatment options are expensive and do not produce 
an acceptable quality of life; and there are not enough kidneys donated to 
meet the current demand for transplants” (Federal Register, 2020). Although 
the executive order was oriented towards improving kidney health in its 
entirety, the order also contained verbiage in section 7a that specifically 
regarded the topic of organ procurement organizations. In Section 7a, the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services was directed to 
“propose a regulation to enhance the procurement and utilization of organs 
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available through deceased donation by revising Organ Procurement 
Organization (OPO) rules and evaluation metrics to establish more 
transparent, reliable, and enforceable objective metrics for evaluating an 
OPO’s performance” (Federal Register, 2020). And so, as a result of the 
executive order and intense calls for reform from stakeholders, CMS 
finalized a new system under which organ procurement systems would be 
evaluated in November 2020. 
Under this new regulatory structure, OPOs will be exposed to greater 
competition from other OPOs and will face heightened scrutiny from CMS, 
ideally resulting in incentives for OPOs to improve. The HHS described their 
reasoning for the new rule as, “in a continued effort to respond to these 
concerns and as required by Executive Order 13879 and controlling statutes, 
we are proposing to revise the outcome measures for re-certification” 
(Federal Register, 2020). Indeed, the HHS significantly revised the 
performance measures by which OPOs will be judged. The change in 
performance measure was “based on public feedback and our own internal 
analysis of organ donation and transplantation rates, we agree that the 
current OPO outcome measures are not sufficiently objective and 
transparent to ensure public trust in assessing OPO performance, nor do 
they properly incentivize the adoption of best practices and optimization of 
donation and organ placement rates” (Federal Register, 2020). 
The finalized rule aimed to “replace the existing outcome measures with 
two new outcome measures that would be used to assess an OPO’s 
performance: ‘donation rate’ and ‘organ transplantation rate’ effective for CY 
2022” (Federal Register, 2020). These performance measures address the 
problems associated with the previous ‘donor yield’ measure by removing 
the performance benchmark in its entirety. Also, the donation rate and organ 
transplantation rate calculations have been explicitly stated, and there is little 
room for interpretation by OPOs. The two new performance rules are 
detailed below: 
1. “The ‘‘donation rate’’ would be measured as the number of actual 
deceased donors as a percentage of total inpatient deaths in the DSA 
among patients 75 years of age or younger with any cause of death that 
would not be an absolute contraindication to organ donation; 
2. The ‘‘organ transplantation rate’’ would be measured as the number 
of organs procured within the DSA and transplanted as a percentage of 
total inpatient deaths in the DSA among patients 75 years of age or 
younger with any cause of death that would not be an absolute 
contraindication to organ donation.” (Federal Register, 2020). 1 
HHS has simplified and removed speculation from the outcome 
performance measures for organ procurement organizations. New from the 
previous system, an organ donor is now defined as a deceased individual 
 
1 Note: definition was slightly revised in the final rule to include organs transplanted as part 
of research in the organ transplantation rate. 
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from which a vascularized organ was procured and transplanted, not simply 
just procured as in the previous definition (OPO, 2019). This ensures that 
OPOs are motivated to increase the chances that an organ they procure will 
be transplanted, which encourages them to act in the best interest of the 
patient receiving the transplant when procuring an organ. 
The first performance measure, the ‘donation rate’, change was designed 
so that all OPOs are incentivized “to pursue all potential donors, even if they 
may only be able to provide a single organ” (OPO, 2019). If this measure was 
to be met and exceeded by each and every OPO, the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) estimates that the United States could have 
approximately 7,200 more organs per year to transplant (Federal register, 
2020).  
By introducing the second performance measure, the ‘transplantation 
rate,’ CMS estimates that if all OPOs meet or exceed the measure, the number 
of annual transplants could increase “from approximately 33,000 to 41,000 
by 2026” (OPO, 2020). 
Because the OPO outcome measures have now been corrected for many 
of their previous flaws, the accountability system for organ procurement 
organizations will be able to work more effectively. The finalized rule also 
addressed this area with reforms. Notably, since the release of the new 
regulations for OPOs in 2018, many OPOs have already significantly 
improved their procurement performance (Doby, et al., 2021). 
Solely based on the two metrics above will OPOs be judged. Unchanged 
from the previous accountability system, all OPOs will be scrutinized every 
four years to conclude whether or not the OPOs are consistent with the two 
new conditions for coverage. 
New to the finalized rule, at the end of each 4 year re-certification cycle, 
all OPOs will be grouped into one of three tiers. Tier 1 includes the highest 
performing OPOs, those in the top 25% of all OPOs according to the two 
performance metrics. Tier 2 will include the next best OPOs, those ranking 
above the median in both of the ranking measures, but below the top 25% of 
OPOs. Tier 3 will include the worst OPOs. Tier 3 OPOs will be those whose 
rankings in one or both measures fall below the median of all OPOs. 
Automatically, “Tier 3 OPOs will be decertified and will not be able to 
compete for any other open DSA” (Doby, et al., 2021). 
The key change to the procurement system in the finalized rule yields 
itself in how the OPOs will be incentivized to compete. To increase 
competition, at the end of each re-certification cycle, tier 2 and tier 3 OPO’s 
DSAs will be opened up for competition. Because these lagging OPOs have 
shown that they are unable to increase their procurement effectiveness, they 
will automatically lose their DSA. However, tier 2 OPOs will be able to 
compete to win their DSA back through competition with tier 1 OPOs. Tier 
3 OPOs, since they have such poor performance, will automatically lose their 
DSA and will have no opportunity to win it back. The opened DSAs will be 
opened for competition to eligible OPOs. Tier 1 OPOs with an interest in a 
given DSA will compete with each other and make arguments to CMS as to 
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why they should be the OPO to take over the newly open DSA. HHS reserves 
the right to either offer the entire DSA to a successful OPO or partition the 
area among several OPOs (Federal Register, 2020). 
 
6. Opportunities for further reform of the new 
regulatory structure 
While the new system, to go into effect in 2022, may solve part of the 
competition problem among OPOs, several glaring issues still exist. 
First and foremost, the first recertification cycle under the new provisions 
will occur in 2026. A glaring example of sluggish government policies at 
work: revisions introduced in November 2020 will not be judged upon for 
years. Meanwhile, patients continue to be added to the waitlist and many are 
losing their lives. Dialysis will continue for many suffering with kidney 
disease, and taxpayer dollars will continue to flow to costly OPOs. Organ 
reform must happen faster. While Organ Procurement Organizations must 
be afforded the ability to change their practices and improve, six years is 
much too long a period to allow OPOs to continue to be inefficient without 
decertification. As stated by Organize, “It is troubling, however, that the rule 
states that failing OPOs will not be decertified until 2026. HHS has shown, 
with objective data, that many of its contractors are failing, and that holding 
them to higher standards will save as many as 5,600 more lives every year; 
to wait six years to do so, by extension, is to consign more than 30,000 
Americans to death” (OPO, 2020). 4 years between decertification processes 
remains much too long of a time period as well. OPOs ought to be held 
accountable on much stricter time frames to ensure OPO compliance and 
improved performance. If an OPO remains an underperformer, quicker 
accountability and decertifications will allow those DSAs to be run sooner 
by efficient OPOs, resulting in more organs procured. 
Yet another problem with the new rule is that the new judgement criteria, 
donation and transplantation rates, are not a comprehensive measure of 
OPO performance. Relationships with hospital administration and staff, 
referral response times, effectiveness of obtaining donation authorization 
from family members, and many other factors make an OPO successful. 
These factors cannot simply be measured by objective factors such as 
donation and transplantation rates. These sub-regulatory performance 
indicators could become very important in the DSA redistribution process, 
as OPOs with similar objective measurements, but different sub-regulatory 
indicators, vie for the same newly opened DSA. Without such sub-regulatory 
data available, the true differences in OPO performance may be unaccounted 
for in the redistribution process. However, the inclusion of these factors in 
CMS’s official decision making process could overburden CMS and allow 
loopholes for OPOs. In the proposed system below, these subregulatory 
factors would play an influential role without creating drag on the organ 
procurement system. 
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A third problem coincides with the redistribution of DSAs following a 
decertification of a tier 2 or tier 3 OPO. The new rule states that either the 
entire DSA would be awarded to a tier 1 OPO, re-awarded to the same tier 2 
OPO, or partitioned among several OPOs. Yet, we run into the same 
problem: slow and ineffective government involvement. How will the 
governing body be sure that the hospitals in the DSA in question prefer one 
OPO to another? Nowhere in the new regulations are hospital’s perspectives 
included in decision making regarding DSA reallocation. How would CMS 
pick the absolute best OPO for the newly open DSA? If several tier 1 OPOs 
are all vying for the same open DSA, how will CMS be able to discern which 
OPO would be best suited to expanding its network and effectively 
beginning the procurement of organs in the new area rapidly, especially in 
the first round of decertifications when CMS has not been able to see how 
OPOs handle territory expansions. One possible solution to this problem 
would be for CMS to deploy new guidelines regarding how they will 
distribute newly-opened OPO territories. To the extent that CMS would be 
able to state that the opinions of hospitals within a given DSA to be 
redistributed would be weighted heavily in distribution decisions, the 
system would be much more stakeholder driven and result in the best 
possible redistribution outcome.  
Importantly, in the decertification process, by awarding all or some of a 
DSA to a new OPO, would CMS be able to avoid a gap in time between 
service coverages? In the proposed rule, CMS estimated that between 7 and 
33 OPOs could be decertified in the first cycle (Federal Register, 2020). This 
is a large proportion of the procurement system that would be completely 
overhauled in a short period of time. Those OPOs taking over new territories 
would have to work quickly to ensure quality of service did not diminish for 
the patients of those regions during the service transition. Because of this 
rapid change brought about by CMS, in the short-term, after decertifications, 
eligible organs could go unprocured as DSAs are dealt new OPOs. However, 
although this remains a possibility in the new system, there is no evidence 
to support that gaps in coverage have occurred historically. Of the 71 OPO 
mergers in history, never was there any discernable disruption in OPO 
performance (Rosenberg, et al , 2020). Also serving as a counter-point, recent 
evidence has shown that OPOs have already significantly improved their 
own procurement performance since the announcement of the proposed rule 
change in December 2018. This suggests that, before the first decertification 
cycle of the new system, many OPOs may have already improved their 
performance so as to avoid decertification (Doby, et al., 2021). 
Lastly, unchanged from the current conditions for coverage, OPOs are 
judged on their compliance with the new conditions for coverage according 
to their average performance across their entire DSA. It is absolutely possible 
for a tier one OPO, maintaining optimal objective procurement numbers in 
its DSA, to be severely underperforming within small pockets of its territory. 
In this scenario, although underperformance would exist in some localities, 
the OPO would not face retaliation or threat of decertification from CMS. 
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While this issue in OPO performance is not newly introduced by the new 
outcome measures, it was also not addressed. With the new regulations, the 
enlargement of individual OPOs territories would make it easier for Tier 1 
OPOs to mask procurement shortcomings in some small areas, especially 
rural ones. Because OPOs cannot easily access and assess patients in rural 
areas, these populations are most likely to be overlooked or ignored. This 
capability for OPOs to underserve rural populations without risk of 
retaliation could exacerbate rural health access issues. 
Clearly, HHS’s new provisions will serve to better the procurement of 
organs, but opportunities still exist to improve upon the procurement system 
and save thousands of lives each year. 
 
7. Introduction to a proposed system: removing 
geographic boundaries and allowing hospitals to 
negotiate contracts with Organ Procurement 
Organizations 
While the proposed changes from HHS will improve the OPO system by 
facilitating competition and instituting more concrete, comparable metrics, 
the systematic problems brought about by the OPO’s structure, their 
geographic monopolies and DSAs, and government involvement could 
hinder the effectiveness of OPOs and restrict the future supply of viable 
procured organs. 
Although the new system does increase the threat of decertification, each 
OPO is only incentivized to be in the top 25% of OPOs, not the absolute best. 
Because each OPO is given a government backed monopoly over a certain 
geographic territory, OPOs do not have incentives to outperform their 
neighboring OPOs, as long as their figures are just good enough, since they 
have no risk of losing hospital partnerships to competitors. As before the 
new regulations, the only threat to OPOs is the federal government revoking 
their certification. And after the revocation of a certification, in the DSA 
redistribution process, taxpayer dollars will be unnecessarily and 
inefficiently allocated to CMS. Instead, this redistribution could occur at no 
charge to the American taxpayer by allowing the primary stakeholders of the 
procurement system, hospitals and organ procurement organizations, to 
independently negotiate. The solution to government waste, slow change, 
and lagging bureaucracies is to nearly completely remove the government’s 
involvement in the hospital-OPO relationship. 
The Department of Health and Human Services ought to allow hospital 
systems to independently negotiate contracts with OPOs for procurement 
services. The only involvement from the government in the procurement 
system would be: 
1. to mandate that all hospital systems contract with an OPO;  
2. to continue to mandate that hospitals must refer all potential donors 
to OPOs;  
3. to ensure compliance of OPOs with the Social Security and PHS Acts;  
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4. to offer permits to operate as organ procurement organizations to 
those already in the system, and to any new organizations wishing to 
enter the market that can prove their worthiness. 
A simple solution to the OPOs severe lack of incentives to compete would 
be to dissolve each OPO’s geographic monopoly, and to replace the 
antiquated system with a freer market, hospital system contract structure. 
 
8. The proposed system detailed 
In this passage, a new, proposed system for organ procurement will be 
outlined using a market and competition based ideology. By allowing and 
encouraging OPOs to compete with each other directly, greater successes 
and advances can be made in organ procurement, ensuring as many organs 
as possible are procured, taxpayer dollars are conserved, and, most 
importantly, lives are saved. 
 
8.1. Removing DSAs 
The proposed system would begin by dissolving OPO DSAs and allowing 
OPOs to compete in each other’s territories. Each OPO would retain its 
facilities and network in its home region, but now OPOs could begin to 
expand (or shrink) their procurement networks into other regions that were 
previously unavailable to them. For instance, an OPO operating in Maryland 
is The Living Legacy Foundation. In Washington D.C., the Washington 
Regional Transplant Community is the local organ procurement 
organization. In the proposed system, this artificially constructed DSA line 
between the two OPOs would be erased and The Living Legacy Foundation 
could now begin to work with hospital systems in Washington D.C., and 
Washington Regional Transplant Community would be able to do the same 
in Maryland. This would remove constraints on OPO infrastructure and 
capabilities as surgeons, staff, and OPO facilities would now be able to 
expand their reach into other DSAs, and the OPO would be able to fully 
utilize its available resources to procure organs in an efficient and effective 
manner. 
 
8.2. Benefits to hospitals 
Hospital systems would also benefit greatly from the proposed system. 
Hospital systems would no longer be required to work with a specific OPO 
based on their location and would be able to entertain offers from multiple 
OPOs.  
Each hospital system, not hospital (to be explained why below), would 
negotiate a contract of optional length that would devote exclusive organ 
procurement rights within the hospital system to a single OPO. Hospital 
systems, because OPOs would now begin to attempt to expand their service 
areas into previously unallowed areas, would be able to field multiple 
contract offers from different OPOs with conditions of service stated in the 
contract. Conditions of service would not be mandated by the federal 
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government but would be negotiated between each hospital system and 
potential OPOs, based on which qualities the hospital system values and 
what services the OPOs are able to provide. These conditions of service may 
include referral response time requirements, operating room time 
constraints, and other factors that could be negotiated between the hospital 
and OPO. The hospital system would grant the exclusive contract to the OPO 
that is able to offer the best terms of service. The OPO that would be able to 
offer the best terms would also be the most efficient and effective OPO. 
Through this system of hospital system contracts, OPOs would be forced to 
either improve their processes or lose hospital contracts, and procurement 
area, to more efficient OPOs. By exposing OPOs to market forces of 
competition, OPOs would be forced to improve their operations or be 
gradually phased out of the procurement market over time. 
Each hospital system is incentivized to sign with the best OPO available 
because when hospitals work with inefficient and slow OPOs, the hospital 
bears real financial costs of ensuring the patient remains viable for 
transplantation. By rewarding its procurement contract to the best possible 
OPO, the hospital system reduces its costs and actively saves the lives of 
many on the transplant waiting list. 
Contracts must be negotiated at the hospital system level in order to 
ensure those hospitals with few eligible donors, usually small rural 
hospitals, would not be ignored. Large hospital systems with small hospitals 
could include in their contracts that certain conditions of service must be met 
for all hospitals within the system. If an OPO was to disregard smaller 
hospitals within the hospital system, the relationship between the OPO and 
hospital system could become strained, encouraging the hospital system to 
not renew its contract with the OPO. 
Contracts would not be mandated to be any length of time but could be 
independently negotiated between hospital systems and OPOs. Rather than 
decertification cycles every four years, this variable contract process ensures 
quicker accountability for OPOs who have provided unsatisfactory 
procurement services to the hospital system. First time contracts between 
hospital systems and OPOs could reasonably be expected to be on the order 
of one to three years, as hospital systems search for the best possible OPO.  
 
8.3. Effects of the proposed system in the short and medium-term 
In the beginning of this systems implementation, hospitals would likely 
continue to work with their previous OPOs, but some, likely on the borders 
of the previous DSAs, having been disappointed in their local OPO’s 
procurement ability, would openly consider offers from neighboring OPOs 
that already have the infrastructure in place nearby to effectively procure 
organs in a timely manner. For instance, the OPO located in D.C. could 
gradually expand into Virginia and Maryland as it is able to offer generous 
terms to the hospital systems nearest its previous DSA borders. Over time, 
this process would continue across the country as the worst performing 
OPOs would be phased out as hospital systems opt to reward their contracts 
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to more efficient OPOs. The most effective OPOs would expand their 
networks and inefficient OPO’s service areas would shrink, increasing the 
percentage of eligible organs procured by the best OPOs. Over time, fewer 
OPOs would exist and only the most efficient OPOs would remain. And, as 
a beneficial side effect, duplicate overhead costs, which make up 
approximately 60% of total procurement costs, could be eliminated (Held et 
al., 2019). Market conditions, rather than government interference, would 
push some OPOs out of the market, and expand the geographic range of 
others.  
 
8.4. Minimal government involvement 
Upon initial setup of the new system, the duties of HHS and CMS would 
be to require and ensure that each hospital system signs an exclusive 
procurement contract with an OPO. At a minimum, CMS ought to provide 
OPOs and hospital systems notice of two years before the implementation of 
the new system. This grace period is necessary to ensure that no viable 
organs go unprocured while hospital systems and OPOs sort out their 
contractual obligations. CMS would also need to mandate, as it already does 
under the current system, that each hospital must refer all eligible donors to 
their OPO, in order to ensure proper compliance from hospitals in the 
procurement process. 
Other responsibilities of CMS, in order to ensure the system operates 
properly and legally, would be to ensure compliance of OPOs with the Social 
Security and PHS Acts. Lastly, in order to ensure the system operated with 
a steady number of OPOs, CMS would offer permits to operate as a 
procurement organization to all OPOs already in operation and would be 
allowed to offer permits to new organizations that could prove worthiness 
regarding the successful and timely procurement of organs. As a part of this 
proposed system, because CMS may be currently statutorily precluded from 
certifying new OPOs, it may be necessary for new federal legislation, 
statutory guidance, or statutory provisions to be enacted in order to permit 
CMS to certify new OPOs (National Organ Transplant, 1984). 
As the least efficient OPOs are phased out of the market, the existence of 
fewer OPOs would also benefit taxpayers. By consolidating organ 
procurement organizations, not only would the system become much more 
efficient, but also redundant positions and processes could be eliminated. 
The entire OPO industry is spending far too much on problematic costs. 
Notably, over 60% of organ procurement costs are directly due to overhead 
(Held, et al., 2019). For instance, OPO CEOs are paid handsomely, with many 
earning over a half of a million dollars in 2019 (IRS, .2  In fact, CEO salary is 
clearly not associated with OPO performance. Many CEOs of failing OPOs, 
according to the new regulations, were suspiciously paid over a million 
dollars per year recently (OPO, 2020). These positions, other executive 
 
2 Review of IRS Form 990. 
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positions, and many overhead costs of inefficient OPOs would be removed 
as the number of OPOs are consolidated under the market system. As the 
most successful OPOs grow larger, duplicative processes could be 
eliminated and the OPOs could streamline their own procurement processes 
by maximizing capabilities of surgeons and support staff. And, because the 
costs of these positions and processes are included in the costs of organ 
transplantation that is passed onto private and public insurance, once they 
are eliminated, organ procurement costs would decrease, saving the 
American taxpayer millions of dollars each year in Medicare and Medicaid 
services. 
No longer would the federal government be responsible for handling 
hospital’s petitions to work with different OPOs or would be responsible for 
revoking contracts from organ procurement organizations for poor 
performance. The market oriented system would perform these tasks 
quickly and without any additional cost to taxpayers. OPOs would be held 
accountable for their own actions and inefficient work by the hospital 
systems themselves, who are arguably much better judges of effectiveness 
than the distant and bureaucratic Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. 
 
8.5. Enactment of the proposed reform 
The system of Organ Procurement Organizations is governed by both 
laws and regulations. The relevant law is in Chapter 42 of the U.S. Code, 
section 273. 3  The section states, “a qualified organ procurement 
organization… has a defined service area that is of sufficient size to assure 
maximum effectiveness in the procurement and equitable distribution of 
organs, and that either includes an entire metropolitan statistical area (as 
specified by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget) or does 
not include any part of the area.” Clearly, designated service areas for OPOs 
are required by law. So, for the above reform to take place, two options 
remain. Either Congress must pass new legislation that would permit the 
removal of designated service areas, or the law may be interpreted such that 
the Department of Health and Human Services could make the change 
independently as a regulatory matter. The law above does not state that the 
designated service areas cannot be overlapping and imposes no limit to their 
size. Perhaps, then, the Department of Health and Human Services could 
declare each OPO’s designated service area as the entire United States. This 
would then open the door to allow OPOs to compete with each other without 
constraints of non-overlapping designated service areas. 
A second legislative obstacle exists in allowing OPOs to independently 
negotiate procurement contracts with hospital systems across the entire 
United States. Section 273 also states that “an organ procurement 
organization shall… have effective agreements, to identify potential organ 
 
3 United States, Congress, National Organ Transplant Act. 1984. 42 USC 273. 
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donors, with a substantial majority of the hospitals and other health care 
entities in its service area which have facilities for organ donations.” If 
service areas were to be expanded according to the proposal above, then this 
clause might not be capable of being met by any OPO. Because each OPO 
would have the entire United States as its DSA, OPOs would not be able to 
have effective agreements with a substantial majority of all U.S. hospitals. 
Most likely, this clause would have to be changed through Congressional 
action to pose no constraints on the number of hospitals each OPO works 
with, and to mandate that OPOs must sign contracts with hospital systems, 
not individual hospitals. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The organ procurement system in the United States has been rife with 
perverse incentives and a lack of accountability since conditions for coverage 
were first announced in 2006. Never has an OPO truly faced consequences 
for poor operations from either the market or the federal government. But in 
2019, President Trump and CMS took action to greatly reform the system. In 
a politically contentious United States, organ donation reform has received 
resounding bipartisan support in Congress. In December 2019, Dan 
Diamond of Politico wrote, “Trump's organ donation overhaul is arguably 
his most popular public health effort, with bipartisan support for cracking 
down on the organ procurement organizations that are responsible for 
recovering organs” (Diamond, 2019). The design of the procurement system 
is essential to the American people and successful design could result in 
thousands of lives saved each year.  
While the changes made recently by CMS are necessary and certainly 
improvements to the previous procurement system, the system’s 
architecture will always limit its effectiveness and prohibit the supply of 
transplantable organs. The limitations of Designated Service Areas and 
government oversight will continue to burden the procurement system. The 
procurement system could benefit from steep reform utilizing the mechanics 
of a stakeholder-based, freer-market system by allowing hospitals to 
independently negotiate with OPOs, thereby provoking competition 
between organ procurement organizations without any ethical issues. By 
allowing Organ Procurement Organizations to compete without the 
constraints of DSAs, and by handing the reigns of the system from CMS to 
hospital systems themselves, the system would guide itself to its most 
efficient and effective state, thereby procuring more organs, and saving 
American lives. 
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